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CULTURAL HERITAGE LAW BETWEEN TRUTH AND
POWER: LAW’S EVOLUTION AND OUR COLLECTIVE
CULTURAL INTEREST IN AN INFORMATIONAL
ECONOMY
Felicia Caponigri, JD, PhD*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine if you will a time when all museums, galleries, foundations, and
other spaces of public trust that usually display the tangible iterations of our
shared cultural heritage, the complex of tangible objects and the tangible
manifestations of intangible practices, representations, expressions,
knowledge, and skills that we, as individuals, communities and as a collective,
recognize as of cultural interest to us,1 are closed. Instead of walking to a
© 2021 Felicia Caponigri. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Publication in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes,
so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to
Notre Dame Law Review Reflection, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Term Teaching Professor; Acting Director of International and Graduate
Programs; and Program Director of the Program on Intellectual Property & Technology
Law, Notre Dame Law School. PhD, IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca; J.D., magna
cum laude, Notre Dame Law School. This reflection is primarily inspired by discussion at a
roundtable for Julie Cohen’s book Between Truth and Power in January 2020, and also
incorporates research and work from my doctoral dissertation. Special thanks to the
participants at the roundtable and to Lorenzo Casini for his comments on this Essay. Any
errors are my own.
1 This meaning is gathered from the definitions of cultural property in the source
nation of Italy and definitions of cultural property and intangible cultural heritage at the
international level. See Decreto Legislativo, 22 gennaio 2004, art. 10, n.42, G.U. Feb. 24,
2004, n.137 (It.) [hereinafter D.Lgs. n. 42/2004 (It.)] (Italian Code of Cultural Property);
Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict pmbl. &
art. 1, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215 (defining cultural property in terms of its relevance
to all mankind); Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage art.
2(1), Oct. 17, 2003, 2368 U.N.T.S. 42671 (defining intangible cultural heritage in terms of
practices, representations, expressions, knowledge, skills). Other literature defines cultural
heritage even more broadly, in light of the emphasis on cultural heritage over cultural
property, and the problematic commoditization that heritage as “property” implies. See
Lyndel V. Prott & Patrick J. O’Keefe, ‘Cultural Heritage’ or ‘Cultural Property’?, 1 INT’L J.
CULTURAL PROP. 307, 311 (1992). For an overview of the legal definitions of cultural
property and cultural heritage at the international level, see generally Lucas Lixinski,
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museum to be as close as we can to a tangible part of our cultural heritage,
walking around a glass or plexiglass box to find the perfect angle at which to
deeply engage with the object, placing ourselves as close to a painting as we
can without the dreaded sensors being set off or a guard asking us to politely
(or more emphatically) step away from the work, we sit in front of our
computer. We watch a video of a museum director taking us on a tour of a
museum gallery, a behind-the-scenes short documentary about an artist at
work and other historical facts, or we may even download or view a threedimensional scan of a tangible cultural property on display in the very gallery
we can no longer access. Our multiple sensory abilities to gather information
about the objects, already compromised or relinquished to others to a certain
extent in the museum, are now wholly abandoned for a visual, purely
informational appreciation of the object. Viewing the object’s replica or
reproduction2 through a screen, outside the context of a museum or gallery
space, outside a physical place of public trust, 3 makes tangible cultural
heritage a piece of intangible, newly reified information which is produced,
accumulated, and processed.4 Shared on social media and on the internet,
largely divorced from the physical context of the museum or other space of
public trust save for hashtags or other location labels, the institutional actors
and publics interacting with this information become even more vast and
varied, and collective meaning-making more fractured and unique.
Far from a description of a twilight zone, this scenario was a present-day
reality in Italy thanks to the advent of the coronavirus pandemic and the
resulting shuttering of museums, galleries, and other public institutions. As
of this writing, many museums in the United States are still under similar
restrictions. The cultural information previously mediated through tangible
properties or, at the very least, through the tangible manifestations of
intangible practices and expressions (as with live performances), is now set
free from the tangible object but fixed again and shared through
technological means as data. In this context, cultural heritage becomes ever
more a term that is meant to produce and accumulate information from our
past in order to support the processing of information about our
contemporary identities in the present. Before the pandemic, this creeping
Definitions: From Cultural Property to Cultural Heritage (and Back?), in INTERNATIONAL
HERITAGE LAW FOR COMMUNITIES 27 (2019). Landscape and natural heritage are, of
course, also part of cultural heritage, but this Essay concentrates on tangible cultural
property and some tangible manifestations of cultural heritage.
2 WALTER BENJAMIN, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in
ILLUMINATIONS 217, 220–21 (Hannah Arendt ed., Harry Zohn trans., 1969). Sonia K. Katyal
has pointed to the numerous copyright law issues that are raised as “intangible images
increasingly replace tangible items of cultural heritage” in a prepandemic museum context
in Technoheritage, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1111, 1117, 1133–1137 (2017).
3 See generally WHOSE MUSE? ART MUSEUMS AND THE PUBLIC TRUST (James Cuno ed.,
2006).
4 See JULIE E. COHEN, BETWEEN TRUTH AND POWER: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF
THE INFORMATIONAL CAPITALISM 16 (2019).
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move to cultural heritage as information was already present through the
digitization of objects and the inclusion of digital tools in galleries to
supplement our experiences of the tangible object in front of us. Now,
however, these digital experiences, no matter the reopening of galleries and
the continued importance of and desire to visit cultural heritage in person,
may, at the very least, be conceived as on equal footing with traditional
presentations of the information naturally contained in cultural heritage.
Museum collections and States showcase their cultural heritage and cultural
property online, making culture an indelible part of the informational
economy in which we now live; images and data points effectively act as
replacements for the tangible objects or live processes meant to be seen in
person. Even as we embrace the opportunity to return to museums in person
and engage with tangible cultural property in all its physicality, digitization
and reproduction remain crucially important parts of the cultural heritage
experience.5 Beyond the museum, States are now investing in digitization as
a crucial part of their regulation of cultural heritage in a postpandemic world.
How should we understand such a shift, and what does it mean for our
collective cultural interest in heritage? Cultural heritage law has a role to play
in answering this question. Indeed, cultural heritage law, whether at the
international, supranational, or national levels, already requires forms of
preservation that may encourage the digital sharing of cultural heritage at the
same time as it seeks to circumscribe such digital exchange.
Julie Cohen’s book, Between Truth and Power, analyzes our shift to an
informational economy, the increasing presence of networked infrastructures
that contest our traditional rule-of-law framework, and the important role
transnational governance institutions play in this context. As subject-matter
examples of the shift to an informational economy, Cohen spotlights labor,
land, and money and inspires us to think about how tangible goods have
become dematerialized and intangible and then reified again as information
and how legal entitlements shape our complex interactions with these newly
complex properties. Taking inspiration from Cohen’s spotlight on labor,
land, and money, this Essay proposes cultural heritage as another subject
matter worthy of the analysis Cohen frames in her book. Is cultural heritage
law, as a legal system that mediates between the truth and power Cohen
details, equipped to deal with heritage’s new essence as part of informational

5 As, perhaps, they always have. Since Roman times reproductions of works have
served to stand in for and, in certain circumstances, even replace lost objects, whether for
study, aesthetic appreciation, or other cultural messages. See Dep’t of Greek and Roman
Art, Roman Copies of Greek Statues, MET MUSEUM ART (Oct. 2002),
http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/rogr/hd_rogr.htm. For an exploration of the
reproducibility of forms in Ancient Greece through schema, see MARIA LUISA CATONI, LA
COMUNICAZIONE NON VERBALE NELLA GRECIA ANTICA [NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION IN
ANCIENT GREECE] (2008). Digitization and the need for the majority of our interactions to
be mediated by technology now seem to have taken this historic reproduction to an
extreme, divorcing it from any materiality.
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capitalism? Does our collective cultural interest, the bedrock of the
classification of cultural property and the recognition of cultural heritage
under the law, look different through the lens of these networked
infrastructures on platforms? If cultural heritage is increasingly seen as
information, as data to be consumed all over the world, how should cultural
heritage law regulate this cultural information, if at all? Should cultural
heritage law embrace technology as a complement to its legal framework? If
so, what does this mean for traditional actors in the cultural heritage space,
especially nation states?
I.

CULTURAL HERITAGE LAW: THE ITALIAN CASE AND ITS EVOLUTIONS IN A
NETWORKED, INFORMATIONAL AGE

Discussions of cultural heritage as a legal notion and definition under
the law often concentrate on the dichotomy between cultural heritage and
cultural property in international law.6 Critiques of the use of “property” to
regulate, at its most comprehensive, “manifestations of human life which
represent a particular view of life and witness the history and validity of that
view”7 are founded in conceptions of property’s fundamental inability to
actuate the community interests at the heart of cultural heritage. 8 Indeed,
likely because of the very uniqueness of the subject matter at issue, the legal
framework that applies to this vast category of “manifestations of human life”
is fractured into different spheres which apply to different slices of the
proverbial cultural heritage pie. We see safeguarding of cultural heritage, at
the international level, as actuated by the making of lists and States’
affirmative obligations to consult communities; 9 and cultural property as
meaning the tangible properties that States define as of importance in specific
categories, including art or history10 or, quite the opposite, “irrespective of
origin or ownership,”11 the “movable or immovable property of great
importance to the cultural heritage of every people.” 12 Intellectual property
law plays its own role in this legal universe, facing critiques as actors try to fill
any cultural heritage law gaps despite intellectual property law’s emphasis on
fixation, its term limits, and its limited definitions of authorship or even who

6

Lixinski, supra note 1, at 27; Janet Blake, On Defining the Cultural Heritage, 49 INT’L
(2000); Prott & O’Keefe, supra note 1, at 307.
7 Prott & O’Keefe, supra note 1, at 307 (see especially the section Problems with
‘Property’ on pages 309–12).
8 See, e.g., id. at 309–12.
9 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage art. 2, Oct.
17, 2003, 2368 U.N.T.S. 42671; Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and
Natural Heritage arts. 4 & 6, Nov. 16, 1972, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151.
10 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property art. 1, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231.
11 Convention on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict
art. 1, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215.
12 Id. at art. 1(a).
AND COMPAR. L.Q. 61
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is an inventor,13 which are uneasy companions for heritage. Proposed legal
frameworks like the Tunis Model Law on Copyright for Developing
Countries,14 suggested additions to the Design Law Treaty,15 or even the use
of copyright law or trademark law to actuate control of source communities’
cultural heritage16 in market nations,17 are all examples of the ways in which
communities and individuals attempt to overcome the roadblocks of legal
gaps and seek to protect their heritage.
The narrative of the application of intellectual property law to cultural
heritage, critiques of it, and even the broader conversation about cultural
property and cultural heritage as terms 18 have, as Cohen observes of the work
of “[l]egal scholars of the information economy,” 19 perhaps tended to focus
too much on “the themes of propertization and control.” 20 Indeed, Cohen’s
consideration in Between Truth and Power of entitlements, broadly defined,
and the law, and not just propertization and control, offers an opportunity to
reconsider cultural heritage law, the legal notion of cultural heritage, and the
broader subject matter at issue in terms that move beyond propertization and
control. Indeed, to a certain extent, this is what the complex statutory legal
framework for cultural heritage in Italy already offers us. While a
fundamental importance is still ascribed to who owns cultural property, and
duties and obligations are theoretically still framed in terms of control, the
consideration of interests, their balancing, and the very existence of our
collective cultural interest, as explored in Italian doctrine and Italian cultural

13 See generally Michael A. Brown, Heritage as Property, in PROPERTY IN QUESTION:
VALUE TRANSFORMATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 49 (Katherine Verdery & Caroline
Humphrey eds., 2004); Michael F. Brown, Can Culture Be Copyrighted? 39 CURRENT
ANTHROPOLOGY 193 (1998); Michael F. Brown, Culture, Property and Peoplehood: A Comment
on Carpenter, Katyal, and Riley’s “In Defense of Property”, 17 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 569
(2010). But see SUSAN SCAFIDI, WHO OWNS CULTURE? APPROPRIATION AND AUTHENTICITY
IN AMERICAN LAW 2 (2005); Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal & Angela R. Riley,
Clarifying Cultural Property, 17 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 581 (2010) [hereinafter Carpenter,
Katyal & Riley, Clarifying Cultural Property]; Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal & Angela
R. Riley, In Defense of Property, 118 YALE L.J. 1022 (2009).
14 World Intell. Prop. Org., Tunis Model Law on Copyright, COPYRIGHT: MONTHLY REV.
WORLD
INTELL.
PROP.
ORG.,
July–Aug.
1976,
at
165,
165,
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/copyright/120/wipo_pub_120_1976_0708.pdf.
15 Margo A. Bagley, “Ask Me No Questions”: The Struggle for Disclosure of Cultural and
Genetic Resource Utilization in Design, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 975, 1015 (2018).
16 See, e.g., Navajo Nation v. Urban Outfitters, Inc. 935 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1154 (D.N.M.
2013); Sealaska Heritage Inst., Inc. v. Neiman Marcus Grp., No. 1:20-cv-00002 (D. Alaska
filed Apr. 20, 2020).
17 John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 AM. J. INT’L
L. 831, 832 (1986).
18 Perhaps with the exception of Katyal et al., who speak in terms of cultural property
as defined by fiduciary duties. See Carpenter, Katyal & Riley, Clarifying Cultural Property,
supra note 13, at 585.
19 COHEN, supra note 4, at 11.
20 Id.
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heritage law’s legislative history, allow for a more nuanced understanding of
the role of cultural heritage law and cultural heritage law’s very future in the
networked information age.
The birth of cultural property law on the Italian territory dates to long
before the use of the terms cultural property and cultural heritage at the
international level in the twentieth century. Central to Italian law’s historic
regulation of the vast category of “manifestations of human life” 21 is a
reference not to cultural property but to things of varying cultural
importance. Papal Bulls in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries concerned
themselves with limiting the circulation of objects of antiquity and prohibiting
the destruction of ancient public buildings.22 Cardinal Pacca’s 1820 edict
grounds its reference to objects of antiquity in their exemplary nature, what
we might term their artistic or educational value; it cites to the potential art
historical merit of marble sculptures by nonliving authors, and cloths and
mosaics, in its establishment of a complex regulatory framework for their
circulation and presence in the Papal States. 23 Prior to Italy’s unification,
individual regions prohibited the exportation of certain objects of antiquity
following this model.24 The early twentieth century saw the Italian State begin
to regulate in this area and grapple with the multiple examples of cultural
heritage on its territory—soon ancient manuscripts, rare prints and
engravings, and even villas, parks, and gardens of artistic or historic interest
came expressly into the law’s ambit.25 In 1939 the Italian government enacted
its Law for the Preservation of Things of Artistic or Historic Interest which would be
applied until 1999 when a consolidated act came into force. In his
21
22

Prott & O’Keefe, supra note 1, at 309.
LORENZO CASINI, EREDITARE IL FUTURO: DILIMMI SUL PATRIMONIO CULTURALE
[INHERITING OUR FUTURE: CULTURAL HERITAGE DILEMMAS] 27 (2016) [hereinafter CASINI,
EREDITARE]; Pope Pius II, Cum Almam Nostrum Urbem (Apr. 26, 1462),
https://online.scuola.zanichelli.it/ilcriccoditeodoro/files/2011/11/legislazione_01.pdf.
Later international legal instruments would similarly prohibit destruction, including the
1907 Hague Convention for Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land which
required that “all necessary steps must be taken to spare as far as possible, buildings
dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments” in article
27. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex art.
27,
Oct.
18,
1907,
36
Stat.
2277,
https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/ART/195-200037?OpenDocument.
23 TOMMASO ALIBRANDI & PIERGIORGIO FERRI, I BENI CULTURALI E AMBIENTALI 4
(2001); EDITTO CARDINAL PACCA, Above the Antiques and the Excavations, (Apr. 7, 1820),
http://www.ssb.vt.it/compendio%20legislativo/EDITTO_CARDINAL_PACCA.pdf.
24 ALIBRANDI & FERRI, supra note 23, at 4 (describing laws in the Kingdom of Naples
in 1822; Tuscany in 1854; Lombardo Veneto in 1745, 1818, and 1827; Parma in 1760; and
Modena in 1857). For an exhaustive compilation of the various edicts and laws emanated
in Italian city-states from 1571 to 1860, see ANDREA EMILIANI, LEGGI, BANDI E
PROVVEDIMENTI PER LA TUTELA DEI BENI ARTISTICI E CULTURALI NEGLI ANTICHI STATI
ITALIANI 1571–1860 (1996).
25 See Legge 20 giugno 1909, n.364, G.U. June 28, 1909, n.150 (It.) (including
modifications from Legge 23 giugno 1912, n. 688, G.U. July 8, 1912, n.160 (It.); R.D. 24
novembre 1927, n.2461, G.U. Jan. 7, 1928, n.5 (It.)).
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presentation of the law to Parliament, Minister Giuseppe Bottai explained the
use of the word “interesse.”26 By the use of the term “interesse” with added
qualifiers such as “artistico, storico, archeologico, o etnografico,”27 the law
intended to refer both to a public concern and also to private rights. 28
Explaining the reasons that the government should indeed concern itself with
this subject matter and the drafting of the rules within the law itself, Bottai
emphasized that the State cannot be disinterested in objects of artistic or
historic interest because they are a precious spiritual and nonspiritual asset of
Italy.29 At the same time, however, the public interest in artistic and historic
objects must also exist in tandem with the rights of private citizens and
institutions.30 A balancing of public and private interests then is at the heart
of Italian law’s decision to subject certain things of cultural interest to duties
of preservation and valorization, such as the communication and
enhancement of cultural property’s importance. 31 Interests are at the heart
of Italian law’s framing of the entitlements surrounding its particular
definition of cultural property and this is so even in the 2004 Code of Cultural
Heritage and Landscape in force today.32
What is, however, the public cultural interest that at times might override
private interests? How is this balancing recognized by Italian administrative
authorities and what fundamentally drives the public cultural interest? As
Michele Cantucci wrote in the mid-twentieth century when re-presenting
Italian cultural property law to a post–World War II world, the interest at the
heart of the law here is made up of both subjective and objective aspects; the
public cultural interest is “essentially a subjective fact, inasmuch as it is not an
absolute value, but a relative value, which is that resulting from the judgments
of subjects, translating itself into, across this evaluation, an interest which is
understood in an objective sense.”33 A thing is understood as being of interest
when one or multiple subjects converge their spontaneous attention on it as
a result of an economic or spiritual judgment. 34 This convergence makes a
thing objectively interesting, but people can also have an interest in
26
27
28

Art. 1, Legge 1 giugno 1939, n.1089, G.U. Aug. 8, 1939, n.184 (It.).
Id.
Mario Serio, Introduzione, in 1 ISTITUZIONI E POLITICHE CULTURALI IN ITALIA NEGLI
ANNI TRENTA [INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURAL POLITICS IN ITALY IN THE 1930S] 331, 334
(Vincenzo Cazzato ed., 2001); Tutela delle cose d’interesse artistico o storico, in 1 ISTITUZIONI E
POLITICHE CULTURALI IN ITALIA NEGLI ANNI TRENTA, supra note 28, at 408, 408–09.
29 Tutela delle cose d’interesse artistico o storico, in 1 ISTITUZIONI E POLITICHE CULTURALI
IN ITALIA NEGLI ANNI TRENTA, supra note 28, at 408, 408.
30 Id.
31 Lorenzo Casini, La tutela e la valorizzazione dei beni culturali, in 3 DIRITTO DELL’ARTE
13, 22–25 (2014) (discussing the purpose of valorization) [hereinafter Casina, La tutela e la
valorizzazione dei beni culturali].
32 See D.Lgs. n. 42/2004 (It.).
33 MICHELE CANTUCCI, LA TUTELA GIURIDICA DELLE COSE D’INTERESSE ARTISTICO O
STORICO 100–03 (1953) (describing this as applied to a thing, through which an interest of
the collective is satisfied).
34 Id.
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something at the same time because they themselves feel a specific feeling or
state because of it.35 The subjective part of interest is what can make an
interest public: the expansion of this interest across social networks and
relationships makes it collective and, therefore, the purpose of satisfying it,
public.36 Artistic interest or historic interest are in fact kinds of public interest:
both artistic and historic qualifiers fulfill specific aims or satisfy certain
collective objectives. 37 Central to decisions about what things are of this
public cultural interest by administrative agencies, and their accompanying
imposition of duties on private individuals to preserve a cultural property 38 or
on public authorities to not alienate a cultural property,39 among others, is
that the public artistic or historic interest under the law is understood in
relation to the aims and interests of the collective. Experts or employees of
the Ministry of Culture who make such determinations cannot be too vague
or too general in their reasons.40 Central to determinations of public cultural
interest is a link to the collective and the ability to recognize administrative
judgments as culturally relevant.
And it is here that Cohen’s observation that “[p]latform-based digital
infrastructures’ affordances for collective meaning-making are widely
recognized”41 is relevant to Italian cultural heritage law. Collective meaningmaking in our modern society, as mediated now through technology, has
begun to shape Italian cultural heritage law in unexpected ways.
Technology’s use as an evaluative support within government institutions in
Italy has already been used. For example, the Ministry of Cultural Heritage
and Activities’ use of an algorithm to determine what monetary amounts to
distribute to performers in show business in 2014 42 was deemed appropriate
upon judicial review, given that it was part of an administrative balancing of
public and private interests that was not contrary to the required technical
reasonableness.43 Even more than a creeping procedural use, however, is
35 Id. at 101; see also Lorenzo Casini, “Italian Hours”: The Globalization of Cultural
Property Law, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 369, 375 (2011) (“[Cultural objects] transmit something
that cannot be touched, such as the terrific emotion that visitors may feel once they enter
the Colosseum in Rome: ‘[r]elics excite a special emotion, even [though] they have no
religious significance.’” (quoting John Henry Merryman, The Public Interest in Cultural
Property, 77 CAL. L. REV. 339, 348 (1989), reprinted in JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THINKING
ABOUT THE ELGIN MARBLES 142, 152 (2d ed. 2009))) [hereinafter Casini, Italian Hours].
36 CANTUCCI, supra note 33, at 101.
37 Id. at 102 (which can include “the conservation of artistic and historical values
considered as a means to elevate culture, [as a means] for the perfecting of the activities of
the spirit . . . . so an individual can develop his personality”).
38 See Casini, La tutela e la valorizzazione dei beni culturali, supra note 31, at 17–22.
39 C.c., art. 822.
40 Cons. Stato sez. vi, 19 ottobre 2018, n. 5986 (reviewing the classification of Lucio
Dalla’s home and studio as cultural property).
41 COHEN, supra note 4, at 86.
42 As described in LORENZO CASINI, LO STATO NELL’ERA DI GOOGLE: FRONTIERE E
SFIDE GLOBALI 59–60 (2020) [hereinafter CASINI, LO STATO NELL’ERA DI GOOGLE].
43 Id. (citing Cons. Stato sez. vi, 30 novembre 2016 n. 5035).
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technology’s role in reproducing cultural properties and supporting these
properties’ various cultural significance, or even, at times, undermining it.
This has proved challenging for Italian cultural heritage law itself, and the law
has had to change and adapt in the face of such dissemination.
The traditional duty imposed by Italian cultural heritage law is one of
preservation of the tangible object. 44 This preservation is justified by the fact
that, caught up in the tangible object, is a public cultural interest unique to
that object.45 Losing the cultural property in its tangible iteration would mean
a loss of that unique public cultural interest and the knowledge of the artistic
or historical value it contains for the benefit of our common community. Part
of this duty to preserve tangible cultural properties includes regulating their
reproduction. Article 107 of the current Code of Cultural Property mandates
that public authorities who hold cultural properties may consent to their
reproduction.46 It is for this reason that the casting of reproductions from
original cultural properties is only exceptionally allowed under the law. 47
Indeed, such an express prohibition has been framed as a way to control the
originality, authenticity, and truth present within the materiality of cultural
property.48 Article 107, and its justification, formed the basis for many express
prohibitions of photographing cultural properties in museums and archives.
As recently as 2013 visitors to the Uffizi were forbidden from taking pictures
of the great works of art they saw, including works which are, in copyright
terms, assuredly in the public domain. Although technically these visitors, as
private individuals who were using the photographs only for study or personal
use, might have fallen into some of the exceptions allowed under Article 108
of the Code, the law’s effective application was overbroad to mitigate an
improper use of reproductions of cultural property. Moreover, despite Article
107’s reference to copyright law (diritto d’autore) as a limit on public
authorities’ privilege to allow or forbid the reproductions of cultural property
in their possession, such a prohibition effectively seemed to inappropriately
extend copyright law well beyond its terms of expiration. Indeed, the fraught
relationship between term limits in Italian copyright law and time thresholds
in Italian cultural property law has been acknowledged in Italian
scholarship.49 In 2014, Article 108 of the Code was amended to allow private
individuals to freely reproduce cultural property so long as such a
reproduction was not for commercial purposes as part of the Art Bonus
44 See Lorenzo Casini, Beni Culturali, in ENCICLOPEDIA GIURIDICA DEL SOLE 24 ORE 5–
7 (2007).
45 Massimo Severo Giannini, I beni culturali [Cultural Properties] 31 RIVISTA
TRIMESTRALE DI DIRITTO PUBBLICO [TRIMESTER REVIEW OF PUBLIC LAW] 3 (1976).
46 Art. 107, D.Lgs. n. 42/2004.
47 Id. at art. 107(2).
48 Lorenzo Casini, Riprodurre il patrimonio culturale? I “pieni” e i “vuoti” normative, 3
AEDON no. 1127–345 (2018) (quoting John Henry Merryman, supra note 35),
http://www.aedon.mulino.it/archivio/2018/3/casini.htm [hereinafter Casini, Riprodurre].
49 Id. For a separate consideration of the application of copyright law at the nexus of
digital technology and cultural heritage see Katyal, supra note 2.
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reform.50 Moreover, reproductions for noncommercial uses related to
freedom of expression or thought or creativity, promotion of the knowledge
of cultural heritage, and valorization of cultural properties by public
authorities who do not possess the cultural property in question are also now
allowed.51 Still other initiatives of the Ministry reflect an increased
acknowledgement of the role that technology can play, such as the institution
of a Digital Library to support public cultural institutions’ digitization efforts 52
and even the creation of Instagram accounts and official websites by the
Uffizi53 itself.
Of course, as other authors have noted, 54 these carveouts for certain
reproductions in Italian cultural property law raise the inevitable question of
whether this historic legal framework can maintain the very entitlements it
has shaped over time. Cultural property is reproduced and then becomes
reified anew through images shared on Instagram; it exists as information or
data with which we interact in networked infrastructures. Even if originally
used for noncommercial purposes and therefore legal under Italian cultural
property law, how is a new entitlement to cultural property not created for
social media users and social media networks platforms? How can cultural
property law forbid, both theoretically and practically, new meanings that are
ascribed to these reproductions, the reproductions’ underlying cultural
properties, and even the reproductions’ use as valuable data by companies?
Expressly forbidden commercial uses revealed on social media already
indicate challenges to the effectiveness of Italian cultural property law in this
area. When in 2014 an Illinois rifle company superimposed an AR-50A1 rifle
on an image of Michelangelo’s David and used it in an advertisement, 55 the
Italian Ministry of Culture found itself engaged in a naming and shaming
campaign, alleging a violation of the decoro or the dignity of the cultural
property under the law in an extra-legal context.56 The false dichotomy
between tangible cultural properties and intangible cultural essences is
increasingly evident on the internet. The growing dissemination of images

50 Casini, Riprodurre, supra note 48; Giovanni Gallo, Il decreto Art Bonus e la
riproducibilità
dei
beni
culturali,
3
AEDON
no.
1127–1–345
(2014),
http://www.aedon.mulino.it/archivio/2014/3/gallo.htm.
51 Art. 108, D.Lgs. n. 42/2004; Casini, Riprodurre, supra note 48.
52 Casini, Riprodurre, supra note 48; Istituto Centrale per la Digitalizzazione del Patrimonio
Culturale—Digital
Library,
MINISTERO
DELLA
CULTURA,
https://www.beniculturali.it/ente/istituto-centrale-per-la-digitalizzazione-del-patrimonioculturale-digital-library (last visited Apr. 17, 2021).
53 For the Uffizi website see Gli Uffizi, LE GALLERIE DEGLI UFFIZI,
https://www.uffizi.it/en/the-uffizi (last visited Apr. 17, 2021); Gallerie degli Uffizi
(@uffizigalleries), INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/uffizigalleries/?hl=en (last
visited Apr. 17, 2021).
54 Casini, Riprodurre, supra note 48.
55 Italy Furious at Gun-Toting ‘David’ Statue in U.S. Rifle Ad, TIME (Mar. 9, 2014, 11:55
AM), https://time.com/17313/italy-furious-at-gun-toting-david-statue-in-u-s-rifle-ad/.
56 See id.
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and technological representations of heritage online reveal the extreme
fragility of the law and legal institutions when confronted with the
information technologies Cohen describes. Indeed, the reproductions of
cultural properties on social media and digital platforms, whether for
noncommercial or even commercial purposes, now, at the very least, help
produce the very public cultural interests in cultural property which Italian
cultural property law is meant to preserve and protect. In this sense, when we
think of the multitude of other legal fields that apply to data and information
(from copyright law to privacy law and data protection laws) Italian cultural
property law might not be alone in framing legal entitlements informed by
cultural interest. Moreover, new-meaning-making and forms of cultural
heritage that are born digital and otherwise informed by an online and purely
informational existence are not a priori regulated by Italian cultural property
law as cultural property.57 The inevitable evolution of Italian cultural property
law into a legal framework more expressly concerned with intangibles might
be required, although this seems unlikely given its obsession with tangible
properties throughout history and the disavowal of intangibles, like text, from
its subject matter.58
On the other hand, an even more express
acknowledgment of Italian cultural property law’s relationship to other legal
frameworks, including intellectual property law and global administrative
norms,59 might fill such cultural heritage gaps in an informational economy.
II.

SOLUTIONS FOR CULTURAL HERITAGE LAW GAPS IN ITALY AND BEYOND
WITHIN NETWORKED INFRASTRUCTURES

As Italian cultural property law has sought to respond to the challenges
raised by its existence in an informational economy, there are examples of the
law’s expansion and evolution, and therefore of the Italian State, as an
expansive regulator of the cultural essence at the heart of cultural property
law in new venues. In this sense, cultural heritage law becomes one legal tool
in an arsenal of others as the Italian State seeks to pursue cultural objectives
in an increasingly global “Google” era.60
As the internet has become increasingly important for cultural
institutions and public museums have undergone structural reforms in Italy,61
museum websites have become a necessary part of the valorization of cultural
heritage. When the Uffizi Galleries, a public institution, was ready to create
its own official website separate from the regional museum association to
57
58

Art. 7-bis, D.Lgs. n. 42/2004 (following its emphasis on materiality).
Tommaso Alibrandi, L’evoluzione del concetto di bene culturale, 75 FORO
ADMINISTRATIVO 2701, 2703 (1999) (report to the Gubbio Convention on the Consolidated
Text on Cultural and Environmental Heritage).
59 See Lorenzo Casini, Beyond Drip-Painting? Ten Years of GAL and the Emergence of a
Global Administration, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 473, 474–77 (2015); Casini, Italian Hours, supra
note 35, at 379–82.
60 CASINI, LO STATO NELL’ERA DI GOOGLE, supra note 42.
61 CASINI, EREDITARE, supra note 22.
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which it belonged, in part to control unofficial ticket sales by unauthorized
third parties to the museum,62 it found itself unable to purchase UFFIZI.COM.
Indeed, another company, BoxNic Anstalt in Luxembourg had registered the
domain name and others through GoDaddy, 63 including UFFIZI.NET,
UFFIZIGALLERY.COM, UFFIZIGALLERY.NET, UFFIZIGALLERY.ORG, and
AMICIDEGLIUFFIZI.COM in 1998.64 Given its business of selling “tickets
online at <uffizi.com> to museums, tours, cultural and sporting events in Italy,
including the Gallerie degli Uffizi,”65 the very activity the Uffizi hoped to
prevent by founding its own websites and registering its name and logos as
trademarks,66 BoxNic Anstalt found itself on the receiving end of an
administrative Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (“UDRP”)
action. Initiated by the Uffizi in 2018, following the rules of the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (“ICANN”) incorporating
this service offered by the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, 67 the
complaint argued that BoxNic Anstalt had no right to use UFFIZI.COM given
the Uffizi Galleries’ fame and its registered EU trademarks.68 Alleging
confusion rendered by the use of such an identical mark as a domain name,
the Uffizi Galleries requested the transfer of UFFIZI.COM from BoxNic
Anstalt.69 As a response to this action, BoxNic Anstalt sued the Uffizi Galleries
in United States District Court in Arizona, following GoDaddy’s terms of
service,70 after WIPO had found in favor of the Uffizi Galleries and ordered
the transfer of the domain name. 71 Observing Uffizi to be the dominant part
of the Uffizi Galleries’ design mark, which it viewed in its textuality and in
translation, the WIPO decision implied the domain name was confusingly
similar to the mark and, moreover, observed the strong historic secondary
meaning in the term Uffizi due to its recognition as indicating the gallery and,
in any event, its present inherent distinctiveness as an arbitrary mark using a
word that had become archaic over time.72 This holding was especially
important in light of BoxNic Anstalt’s arguments that the word “uffizi” was
62 Editorial Staff, Uffizi Galleries Gets New Website and Logo, FLORENTINE, (Sept. 29,
2017, 9:32 AM), https://www.theflorentine.net/2017/09/29/uffizi-galleries-new-websitelogo/ (“[E]liminating misinformation and price gouging is a leading mission of the new
website.”).
63 Complaint at 2, BoxNic Anstalt v. Gallerie degli Uffizi, No. CV-18-1263, 2020 WL
570945 (D. Ariz. Feb. 5, 2020).
64 BoxNic Anstalt, 2020 WL 570945, at *2 (D. Ariz. Feb. 5, 2020); Complaint, supra note
63, at *2, 3; see also BoxNic Anstalt v. Gallerie degli Uffizi, No. CV-18-1263, 2020 WL
2991561, at *1 (D. Ariz. June 3, 2020).
65 Complaint, supra note 63, at *2, *3.
66 Uffizi Galleries Gets New Website and Logo, supra note 62.
67 Domain Name Dispute Resolution Service for Generic Top-Level Domains, WORLD INTELL.
PROP. ORG., https://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/gtld/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2021).
68 Complaint, supra note 63, at Ex. F.
69 Complaint, supra note 63, at Ex. F, pt. VI, VII.
70 Complaint, supra note 63, at *2.
71 Complaint, supra note 63, at *2, *5.
72 Complaint, supra note 63, at Ex. H.
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generic or descriptive inasmuch as it translated to “offices.” 73 Despite filing a
detailed complaint alleging reverse domain hijacking, the decision of the
WIPO arbitrator is the only one on the merits, given that the Uffizi Galleries
won on procedural grounds in the District Court of Arizona, which entered a
default judgment when BoxNic Anstalt failed to “participate in the
litigation.”74
While the substantive trademark legal issues in the case and domain
names’ mediation of cultural interest are of interest, especially when read in
light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Booking.com75 and our
ability to identify UFFIZI.COM with the Uffizi in Florence, for the purposes of
this Essay the role of ICANN as a transnational governance institution and the
UDRP as a standard-setting mechanism are more relevant. In this instance,
we see how a State’s recourse, through a public museum, to ICANN’s policies
and its embrace of WIPO arbitration mechanisms is an instance of enforcing
our collective cultural recognition of the Uffizi outside of cultural heritage
law. In her book, Cohen describes ICANN as an example of “emergent
transnational legal-institutional models, supplying new templates for the
configuration and exercise of network-and-standard based governance
authority.”76 The Uffizi Galleries’ participation in this model and its embrace
of the internet and its procedures and standards to police not only the
economic results associated with its name (by halting unauthorized ticket
sales) but the recognition of the Uffizi Galleries as an important cultural
institution and purveyor of cultural heritage indicates a solution for gaps in
Italian cultural heritage law as it exists in an informational economy. Of
course, whether this is a proper solution is another question. Cohen’s work
highlights how the multistakeholder-based model of ICANN can both impose
positive “accountability mandates”77 and yet also create “a significant policy
tilt toward relatively well-resourced interests concerned chiefly with
protection of trademarks and other intellectual property.”78 While the WIPO
arbitrator’s decision relied on BoxNic Anstalt’s submitted evidence more than
the Uffizi’s to decide on secondary meaning to order the transfer of
Uffizi.com to the Uffizi Galleries, the question of whether states charged with
preserving cultural property and managing important, historic cultural
institutions might have an edge in certain network-and-standard based
governance authorities is an important one for the evolution of our collective
cultural meaning-making in the internet age. Might a State inappropriately

73 Complaint, supra note 63, at Ex. H.
74 BoxNic Anstalt v. Gallerie degli Uffizi, No. CV-18-1263, 2020 WL 570945, at *2 (D.
Ariz. Feb. 5, 2020).
75 U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. v. Booking.com B.V., 140 S. Ct. 2298, 2301 (2020) (“A
term styled ‘generic.com’ is a generic name for a class of goods or services only if the term
has that meaning to consumers.”).
76 COHEN, supra note 4, at 210.
77 Id. at 230.
78 Id.
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frame our collective cultural interest and cultural recognition by exercising
trademark rights, controlling accompanying domain names, and replacing its
regulation of the reproduction of cultural property itself with the regulation
of the use of the names and marks of its cultural institutions?
The Uffizi example showcases State action through a networked
governance arrangement, but, as Cohen describes in Between Truth and Power,
transnational corporations and the global platforms they operate can set
policy just as much as a sovereign state and exert a practical sovereignty in the
authority they wield.79 Indeed, this authority is highly evident in the ways in
which transnational corporations and digital platforms affect culture, cultural
policies, and even the very definition of what constitutes our cultural heritage.
In Italy, off-the-internet, close connections between historic Italian, now
multinational, corporations, the renovations of cultural heritage sites, and
corporate events already blur the lines between the defined roles of public
and private actors in the cultural heritage sphere, even producing
performances and products that have immediate cultural impact. 80 And we’ve
seen how Facebook’s decisions about what counts as inappropriate nudity
have removed culturally significant works of art from the online visual
canon.81 Policies affecting cultural heritage put in place by corporations as
digital platforms can increase their own cultural authority and place them in
a position of defining the authenticity and veracity of what is or is not cultural
heritage.
In July of 2020 Facebook announced its implementation of a policy that
would require content “that attempts to buy, sell or trade in historical
artifacts” to be removed.82 This policy is broader than its policy to date, which
had only prohibited “the sale of stolen [historical] artifacts.”83 While
Facebook’s prohibition on the transfer and sale of stolen property mitigates
potential (but unlikely) liability under the National Stolen Property Act

79 Id. at 234–35.
80 As for example, consider Fendi’s fashion show at the Trevi fountain, an inalienable
cultural property owned by the Italian government after sponsoring the fountain’s
renovation. Fiona Sinclair Scott, Models Walk on Water as Karl Lagerfeld Makes History, CNN
(Aug. 15, 2016), https://edition.cnn.com/style/article/fendi-historical-couture-show-trevifountain/index.html. Bulgari’s renovation of the Spanish Steps and its staging of a
presentation for its perfume campaign on the same is another example. Katie O’Malley,
Bella Hadid Brings Rome to a Standstill with Her Most Magical Model Moment to Date, ELLE (May
25, 2017), https://www.elle.com/uk/fashion/celebrity-style/news/a35995/bella-hadidrome-spanish-steps/.
81 Gareth Harris, Long-Running Facebook Battle over Censored Courbet Painting Gets Happy
Ending,
ART
NEWSPAPER
(Aug.
6,
2019,
12:15
PM),
https://www.theartnewspaper.com/news/facebook-legal-battle-over-courbet-paintingwinds-down.
82 Tom Mashberg, Facebook, Citing Looting Concerns, Bans Historical Artifact Sales, N.Y.
TIMES (June 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/23/arts/design/facebooklooting-artifacts-ban.html.
83 Id.
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(NSPA),84 it also expands norms promulgated through international,
supranational, and national law to prohibit illicit sales and trafficking of
cultural property, filling its gaps. While under the 1970 Convention on the
Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of
Ownership of Cultural Property,85 and its implementing Cultural Property
Implementation Act,86 the United States has instituted strict import controls
for illegally exported cultural property; such controls and bilateral
agreements entered into with source nations may not implicate digital
platforms.87 While source nations and private individuals can bring suit in
civil actions to recover stolen cultural property, and perhaps allege that a
digital platform is also liable, like an online auction house, if the sale took
place over their site,88 intergovernmental and international nongovernmental
organizations alike have been vocal about the practical and legal limits of the
liability of digital platforms for the trafficking of antiquities. 89 One of the most
important parts of the limits on digital platforms’ liability is grounded in the
dilemma of tangible and intangible property. Digital platforms do not have
the tangible cultural property offered by a seller in their possession, 90 nor are

84 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–15; see also Jennifer Anglim Kreder & Jason Nintrup, Antiquity
Meets the Modern Age: eBay’s Potential Criminal Liability for Counterfeit and Stolen International
Antiquity Sales, 5 CASE W. RSRV. J.L., TECH. & INTERNET 143, 159–65 (2014) (exploring
Ebay’s liability under the NSPA for its role in illicit antiquities sales and concentrating on
the challenges of the mens rea requirement).
85 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, supra note 10.
86 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–13.
87 Although the 1970 Convention’s Operations Guidelines note that States are
expected to “monitor the online sales of cultural property and even create a network among
the public to supervise the online market and notify the State authorities when an object of
dubious origin appears.” See UNITED NATIONS EDUC., SCI. & CULTURAL ORG., FIGHTING
THE ILLICIT TRAFFICKING OF CULTURAL PROPERTY: A TOOLKIT FOR EUROPEAN JUDICIARY
AND
LAW
ENFORCEMENT,
38
(2018),
http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CLT/movable/pdf/Toolkit
.pdf (citing to paragraph 69 of the Operation Guidelines); see also What Should I Do If I See a
Stolen
Item
on
Marketplace?,
Help
Center,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/help/312500235963976 (last visited Apr. 17, 2021) (Facebook
Marketplace policies encouraging users to contact law enforcement if they see a stolen item
for sale on the platform).
88 See generally Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
89 Basic Actions Concerning Cultural Objects Being Offered for Sale over the Internet,
UNESCO,
https://en.unesco.org/sites/default/files/basic-actions-cultural-objects-forsale_en.pdf (UNESCO, ICOM, and INTERPOL guidelines); AMR AL-AZM & KATIE A. PAUL,
FACEBOOK’S BLACK MARKET IN ANTIQUITIES: TRAFFICKING, TERRORISM, AND WAR CRIMES 4–
5 (2019), http://atharproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/ATHAR-FB-ReportJune-2019-final.pdf (ATHAR Project Report).
90 Which might indicate a digital platform is not liable under the NSPA, apart from
the high bar of its mens rea requirement, given that the digital platform simply transmits
intangible images of the object. See United States v. Yijia Zhang, 995 F. Supp. 2d 340, 350
(E.D. Pa. 2014) (holding the NSPA did not apply when the government accused the
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they generally liable, in the United States, for individual content posted by
users thanks to Section 230 of the 1996 Communications Decency Act. 91 The
dematerialization of cultural property and its reification into images and data
points, however, presents a potential workaround to these limits for the
protection of cultural property. In certain limited circumstances, digital
platforms are already required, under DMCA safe harbor provisions and
other intermediary liability rules,92 to remove or report content that infringes
intellectual property or is otherwise prohibited by federal law. 93 The
expansion of Facebook’s policy to content itself, beyond tangible cultural
property to its reproduction and image, raises questions about what counts as
a historical artifact, who decides and how.94 Proposals for the change in policy
define a historical artifact as “rare items of significant historical, cultural, or
scientific value . . . specifically . . . [p]roducts of archaeological discoveries
and excavations[;] [a]ntiquities such as ancient funerary items, ancient
tombstones, ancient coins, engraved seals, etc.[;] [h]uman remains and
mummified body parts[;] [a]ncient scrolls and manuscripts.”95 Facebook
consulted experts in its elaboration of the policy and recommendations, and
through the policy it aspires to implement international cultural property laws
and to frustrate what has been described as “the platform[’s use as] . . . a
digital black market where users buy and sell illicit antiquities originating
from conflict zones.”96
However, the broadening of Facebook’s policy regarding historical
artifacts to organic content includes Facebook in the collective meaningmaking surrounding the reproductions of cultural property in potentially new
ways. While a positive expansion of the obligations is more often required of

defendant of stealing digital files alone, and not a physical property which would satisfy the
“goods, wares, or merchandise” requirement of the act).
91 AL-AZM & PAUL, supra note 89, at 2. Cohen discusses the narrative that supports
this in the face of platforms’ increasing moderation and control of how users see content
on their sites in a section titled The Most Important Law, COHEN, supra note 4, at 97–101.
92 Kreder & Nintrup, supra note 84, at 169–74 (contrasting the United States with
Germany). Note that Art. 20, Council of Europe Convention on Offences Relating to Cultural
Property,
COUNCIL
EUR.,
https://www.coe.int/it/web/conventions/full-list//conventions/rms/0900001680710435 (last visited Apr. 17, 2021) (Council of Europe
Treaty Series No. 211), asks states that are party to the Convention to “enable the
monitoring and reporting of suspicious dealings or sales on the internet” at the national
level and “encourage internet service providers, internet platforms and web-based sellers to
co-operate in preventing the trafficking of cultural property by participating in the
elaboration and implementation of relevant policies.”
93 See 18 U.S.C. § 2258A.
94 See Mashberg, supra note 82.
95 FACEBOOK, PRODUCT POLICY FORUM, RECOMMENDATION: SALE OF HISTORICAL
ARTIFACTS (2020), https://about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/06.23.2020-PPFDeck_Sale-of-Historical-Artifacts.pdf.
96 Id. But see AL-AZM & PAUL, supra note 89.
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states under international law,97 the policy also represents a potentially
slippery slope, revealing the cultural authority that digital platforms can exert
in the heritage sphere. Facebook’s definition of what counts as a historical
artifact may leave important categories out. 98 Its use of certain experts over
others, and its in-house deliberations as to what counts as inappropriate
content under the policy might establish concentric circles of cultural
property standards within its network and transnational governance structure.
In examples of the content that would be taken down, for example, Facebook
left Native American arrowheads out of the historical artifacts category. The
implementation of the policy raises the possibility that Facebook and its
affiliates, as platforms with their own networked infrastructures, have become
a definitive part of the transnational governance institutions that mediate our
collective cultural interest in these historical artifacts, especially in our
understandings of cultural property and its existence in our tangible world,
through the standards promulgated in a digital space. And these standards
raise important questions. When does an image actually depict a historical
artifact? When is there a difference between an image, a reproduction of a
historical artifact, and the historical artifact itself? Is this Facebook policy
another way to regulate certain uses of cultural property that infringe a
cultural property’s dignity, including an appreciation of them outside their
original context in violation of the laws of their country of origin? Or, do such
standards move the dial of our collective meaning-making to a more limited
stage, circumscribing the ways in which we identify what is of cultural interest
to us?99
CONCLUSION
Cultural heritage law is further evolving and responding to the
increasingly important role that platforms and other structures of the
informational economy play in the evolution of our collective cultural
interest. It is important that the information inherent in cultural heritage be
appropriately inherited for our future. Assuring such an inheritance is the
proffered goal of cultural heritage law, but, in the face of its ineffectiveness or
challenging application, that law is increasingly supplemented by other legal
disciplines and by transnational governance institutions, including
corporations and digital platforms. As the cultural essence of cultural
97 As with the Council of Europe’s Convention on Offences Relating to Cultural
Property’s requirement that States work with internet service providers and social media
platforms and its inapplicability to the United States. See supra note 92.
98 Although its policies may also include other subject matter of import, such as
endangered species.
See Regulated Goods, Community Standards, FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/regulated_goods (last visited Apr. 17,
2021).
99 This is implied by a move from the written to the oral, a decrease in the range of
ways to read a text, and an emphasis on other forms of evaluative metrics. See CASINI, LO
STATO NELL’ERA DI GOOGLE, supra note 42, at 87–89.
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property is freed from the tangibility of an object, and cultural heritage in its
intangible nature is shared across digital media and through technology, the
tangible and intangible divide that has grounded cultural heritage law in a
source nation like Italy may be progressively vanishing. Nevertheless,
collective cultural meaning and its production are still at the heart of the
circulation of cultural heritage as information. Perhaps cultural heritage law,
in Italy and elsewhere, should embrace technology and the other legal fields
that accompany it, including intellectual property, privacy law, and data
protection, more fully as complements to its own goals and policies. While
this may seem troubling in light of the purposes of these other, noncultural
heritage law regimes, the actions of States and digital platforms through
networked structures may already reveal a willingness to use other legal means
to accomplish cultural heritage ends. In Between Truth and Power, Cohen tells
us that countermovements are temporary and that the law can mediate
between truth and power to engender “real, incremental improvement.”100
Perhaps an expansive, complementary perspective of cultural heritage
engendered by technology is a countermovement, an innovation; perhaps it
is a precursor to cultural heritage law’s eventual response to the justice that
the use of these other legal tools and structures seek. In any event, these
examples, and the history of cultural heritage law in Italy, indicate that as long
as there is truth and power to be had through culture, the law will attempt to
mediate between the two for the benefit of our collective society.

100

COHEN, supra note 4, at 270.

